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THE OBLIGATION TO BARGAIN IN GOOD FAITH
by
R. W. Fleming*
T MAY be predicted with a reasonable degree of confidence that
two of the most important questions involved in the duty to
bargain litigation of the sixties will be:
1. To what extent will the new issues which are likely to arise be
subject to mandatory bargaining?-a new phase of an old question,
in which "job security"' and "internal union affairs"' are likely to
be in the forefront.
2. Insofar as such demands are held to be subject to voluntary
bargaining, what role will the government play?-which, in turn,
involves an analysis of the Borg-Warner' and Insurance Agents'4
cases.
That the above questions are likely to receive primary attention
in the years immediately ahead is not to say that all other questions
will be unimportant. By way of example, roving reconnaisance
parties will surely continue to probe the front with respect to kinds

of information which must be furnished in bargaining,' and conclusions as to whether a given attitude or approach to collective

bargaining constitutes "good faith" will always have to be drawn.'
Nevertheless, the important policy question appears to be what
role the government is going to play in shaping collective bargaining, and that question resides within the suggested framework.
An elaborate history of the origin and development of the good
faith bargaining requirement would contribute little to the present
analysis. A brief history is, however, both warranted and necessary.
I. A LOOK AT THE PAST

Though the Wagner Act was introduced in the 74th Congress
without subsection 5 of Section 8, the language was added by the
* B.A., Beloit College; LL.B., University of Wisconsin; Professor of Law, University of
Illinois. This Article was adapted from a speech delivered to the Eighth Annual Institute
on Labor Law, Southwestern Legal Foundation, Dallas, Texas, November 2, 1961.
This Article will appear in modified form in Shister, Aaron & Summers, Public Policy
and Collective Bargaining (1962), to be published by Harper & Bros. under the sponsorship of the Industrial Relations Research Ass'n. A more expanded version of the
same material appeared in Fleming, The Obligation to Bargain in Good Faith, 47 Va. L.
Rev. 988 (1961). The cooperation of both publishers is gratefully acknowledged.
'Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 362 U.S. 330 (1960).
'Allen Bradley Co. v. NLRB, 286 F.2d 442 (7th Cir. 1961).
'NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1957).
4 NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Int'l Union, AFL-CIO, 361 U.S. 477 (1960).
'Sylvania Elec. Products, Inc. v. NLRB, 48 L.R.R.M. 2313 (1st Cir. 1961).
6 International Typographical Union, AFL-CIO v. NLRB, -U.S.-,
81 Sup. Ct. 855
(1961).
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Senate Committee after Lloyd K. Garrison, chairman of the old
National Labor Board, insisted that it was necessary in order to
make the right of self-organization effective.7 Even so, the legislative history of the subsection leaves considerable doubt as to what
the members of Congress had in mind. Senator Walsh assured his
colleagues that the Act would only lead employee representatives
to the door of their employer, without going beyond it,8 but at the
same time expressed confidence that "the employer will deal reasonably with his employees."'
The National Labor Board, in making its first official attempt to
define the "right" thus conferred, decided that it involved an implicit
reciprocal duty in employers to bargain, x" and that this duty involved something more than a bare requirement that the employer
meet and confer with employee representatives. "True collective
bargaining involves more than the holding of conferences and the
exchange of pleasantries. . . . While the law does not compel the
parties to reach an agreement, it does contemplate that both parties
will approach the negotiations with an open mind and will make
a reasonable effort to reach a common ground of agreement."'"
Whatever doubts remained with respect to the above were laid to
rest with the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act. A new section, 8 (d),
was made to read:
For the purposes of this section, to bargain collectively is the perform-

ance of the mutual obligation of the employer and the representative of
the employees to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with
respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment,
or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder,
and the execution of a written contract incorporating any agreement
reached if requested by either party, but such obligation does not
compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a
concession ... "
At the same time 8(b) (3) imposed upon labor organizations a
duty to bargain corresponding to that of the employer.'"
Having decided that the law required the parties to do more than
meet, in order to fulfill the good faith bargaining requirement, the
The duty to bargain had not been originally included. Hearings on S. 1958 Before the
Senate Committee on Education and Labor, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 137 (1935).
879 Cong. Rec. 7659-60 (1935).
9 Ibid.
"ONational Lock Co., I N.L.B. 15 (1935); Hall Baking Co., I N.L.B. 83 (1934).
11S. Dresner & Son, 1 N.L.B. 26 (1934); Edward G. Budd Mfg. Co., 1 N.L.B. 58 (1933).
"Connecticut Coke Co., 2 N.L.B. 88-89 (1934).
13Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 8(d), 61 Stat. 142 (1947),
29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1958).
'"Labor
Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 8(b)(3), 61 Stat. 141
(1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (3) (1958).
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board and the courts could not escape a further definition of what
constituted good faith."5 "Good faith" bargaining could hardly exist
in a vacuum. The parties had to be bargaining about something. The
act said that the union represented the employees with respect to
"wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment."' 1
Suppose the bargaining demand could not reasonably be said to
fall within that classification? Or suppose it did, but to comply
would result in the violation of some other law? These were
problems which the NLRB could not avoid, and the result was a
classification system which categorized bargaining demands as illegal, voluntary, or mandatory. Illegal demands were disposed of
with relative ease. If, for instance, the union sought a type of union
security outlawed by the Taft-Hartley Act, the employer could
refuse to bargain without being guilty of an unfair labor practice.'
But the difference between voluntary and mandatory subjects, and
the results which should flow from such a distinction, were not
always clear. As early as 1939, the NLRB held that an employer
could not insist that the union organize the employer's competitors
before an agreement was signed, because this was not within the
area of bargaining required by the above language." In 1940 the
Board ruled that an employer's proposal that a union post a performance bond was outside the area of mandatory bargaining and
could not be insisted upon as a condition precedent to the agreement." These rulings were subsequently sustained by the courts.0
"5In its early decisions under the Wagner Act, the NLRB decided that "good faith"
in bargaining meant a sincere desire to reach an agreement-though this definition was
variously phrased. Highland Park Mfg. Co., 12 N.L.R.B. 1238 (1939); Atlas Mills,
3 N.L.R.B. 10 (1937). The bargainer's state of mind was the decisive factor, but mental
state had to be inferred from totality of conduct. Affirmative and negative guideposts
were soon set up. An employer must actively participate in the negotiations, Highland
Park Mfg. Co., supra; Scandore Paper Box Co., 4 N.L.R.B. 910 (1938), not just listen
and reject union proposals. Gagnon Plating & Mfg. Co., 97 N.L.R.B. 104 (1951). He must
also make counter-proposals when demands of the union were not satisfactory to him.
J. H. Rutter-Rex Mfg. Co., 86 N.L.R.B. 470 (1949); Weiner, dba. Benson Produce Co.,
71 N.L.R.B. 888 (1946). On the negative side, the employer could not engage in stalling
tactics, Stanislaus Implement & Hardware Co., 101 N.L.R.B. 394 (1952), enf. granted,
226 F.2d 377 (9th Cir. 1955), could not suddenly shift his position when agreement was
near, NLRB v. Nesen, 211 F.2d 559 (9th Cir. 1954), could not reject provisions routinely
placed in most contracts-such as recognition or arbitration clauses, Reed & Prince Mfg.
Co., 96 N.L.R.B. 850 (1951), enf. granted, 205 F.2d 131 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 346
U.S. 887 (1953), or withhold agreement on trivial matters, such as the use of company
bulletin boards. Certain types of conduct, such as refusal to sign an agreement once
reached, were held to be so clearly inconsistent with good faith as to be per se violations
of the act. NLRB v. Highland Park Mfg. Co., 110 F.2d 632 (4th Cir. 1940).
'e See note 13 supra.
7
' NLRB v. National Maritime Union of America, 175 F.2d 686 (2d Cir. 1949).
"SGeorge P. Pilling & Son Co., 16 N.L.R.B. 650 (1939), enf. granted, 119 F.2d 32
(3d Cir. 1941).
0
" Jasper Blackburn Products Corp., 21 N.L.R.B. 1240 (1940).
5
" NLRB v. Dalton Tel. Co., 187 F.2d 811 (5th Cir. 1951); and NLRB v. Darlington
Veneer Co., 236 F.2d (4th Cir. 1956).
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On the other hand, "wages, hours, and other terms and conditions
of employment" were held to include such items as Christmas
bonuses,"1 the rental of company-owned houses," the price of meals
furnished by the employer, and free-time for coffee breaks during
working hours.24
Mandatory subjects, said the Board, could be bargained to an
impasse without being guilty of an unfair labor practice, but voluntary subjects, which were outside the statutory language, could not.
This was the general status of the law when the Borg-Warner's case
came before the Supreme Court in 1958. And it is to that case, and
the analytical framework which it provides for the disposition of
future cases, that we must now turn.
II. THE BORG-WARNER FRAMEWORK

Shortly after the UAW was recognized as the bargaining agent
for the Wooster Division of Borg-Warner, in 1952, it presented
bargaining demands. The Company, in turn, submitted counterproposals, two of which called for: (1) a "ballot" clause, calling
for a pre-strike vote of employees (union and non-union) as to the
employer's last offer, and (2) a "recognition" clause which excluded
the international, which had been certified, and substituted the local.
The NLRB held that insistence upon either of these clauses amounted
to a refusal to bargain, and ordered the company to cease insisting
upon either clause as a condition precedent for accepting a collective
bargaining agreement." The Supreme Court agreed with the Board
on both counts.22
From the very first, the union made it clear that the ballot clause
was wholly unacceptable to it; however, the company nevertheless
insisted. A strike ensued, which was ultimately settled by an agreement containing both of the controversial clauses. Prior to the signing of the agreement the International filed unfair labor practice
charges, contending that insistence by the company on inclusion of
these clauses constituted a refusal to bargain. The Trial Examiner
specifically found that neither side was guilty of bad faith, but,
nevertheless, concluded that the company was guilty of a per se
unfair labor practice. He reasoned that both of the clauses in contention were outside the scope of mandatory bargaining, and that
2

" NLRB v. Niles-Bement-Pond Co., 199 F.2d 713 (2d Cir. 1952).
NLRB v. Bemis Bros. Bag Co., 206 F.2d 33 (5th Cir. 1953).
2
" Wayerhauser Timber Co., 87 N.L.R.B. 672 (1949).
4
Fleming Mfg. Co., 119 N.L.R.B. 452 (1957).
22356 U.S. 342 (1957).
26113 N.L.R.B. 1288.
27 356 U.S. at 342.
22
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the company's insistence upon them over the union's opposition
amounted to a refusal to bargain as to mandatory subjects of collective bargaining.
Though the Supreme Court ultimately sustained the NLRB, four
of the justices thought the ruling on the ballot clause was wrong.
In large part this was because of a deep-seated feeling that Congress
intended "to assure the parties to a proposed collective bargaining
agreement the greatest degree of freedom in their negotiations and
to require the Board to remain as aloof as possible from regulation of
the bargaining process in its substantive aspects.""8
Most of the criticism of the Borg-Warner decision has been directed at its alleged interference with the scope of collective bargaining.
In the actual case the realities of bargaining were that the BorgWarner company was the stronger of the two antagonists. Thus,
the union refused to discuss the ballot clause, the company simply
sat tight, weathered a month-and-a-half strike, and then obtained
the contract it wanted-including the ballot clause. Absent any
interference by the NLRB or the courts, the company achieved what
it wanted in bargaining. It did this while continuing to engage in
what the Trial Examiner found was good faith bargaining. The
Board's decision, sustained by the Supreme Court, had the effect of
changing the bargaining results, for it ordered the company to cease
and desist from insisting upon inclusion of the ballot proposal in
the contract. Viewed from the vantage point of sound collective
bargaining, was this a good or a bad result? There will be a temptation to answer this question on the basis of whose ox is being gored.
Thus, company representatives may be inclined to feel that the result is quite outrageous, while unions may be entirely satisfied. It is
not difficult to demonstrate that this is hardly an adequate basis for
reaching a conclusion. Take an example which has recently been in
the news. The UAW has been complaining that at the very time
that Ford insists upon the necessity for holding the line on wage
increases it has been passing out liberal bonuses to its executives."
Suppose in bargaining the UAW took the position that the new
contract must contain a clause in which the company agreed to
refrain from giving any bonuses to executives during the life of the
new contract. Presumably such a bargaining demand would be
legal, in the sense that there is no reason why the company could
not agree to such a clause if it so desired. At the same time the
demand could hardly be said to fall within the mandatory bargain2

1id. at 356.

29No.

412 CBNC Part 1, March 17, 1961, p. 1.
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ing area, since it would have nothing directly to do with "wages,
hours, and other terms and conditions of employment." A reasonable argument could be made by the UAW that it could not be
expected to exercise restraint on the wage front at the same time that
the company passed out handsome bonuses to executives. Therefore,
the union would not necessarily abandon a good faith bargaining
posture by insisting upon inclusion of the clause in the contract.
Could the union bargain to an impasse on this issue? Under the
majority rule in Borg-Warner it could not, for insistence upon a
non-mandatory subject would, per se, constitute a refusal to bargain.
Under the minority rule, such insistence would not necessarily be an
unfair labor practice-the decision would presumably hinge on a
look at other factors before giving the final answer. Would industry
representatives be outraged by application of the majority's decision
to this set of facts? Would labor people be pleased with it?
The point of this analysis is, of course, that quite apart from the
voluntary-mandatory dichotomy, which will be discussed at greater
length elsewhere, the Borg-Warner rule does have the effect of restricting bargaining. In the actual case the company had the power,
while bargaining in good faith on a legal matter, to achieve its
bargaining demand. The Board and the Supreme Court would not
let it do so. In the hypothetical example, the UAW might have
achieved its bargaining objective, while bargaining in good faith on
a legal demand. The Borg-Warner rule could prevent it from doing
so. It can be said that any other rule would simply place a premium
on bargaining power, and is, therefore, undesirable. This may be
true, but exactly the same criticism could be made with respect to
subject matter in the mandatory category, and in such a case neither
the Board nor the courts would interfere. In fact, the essence of the
American labor-management policy is freedom to exert economic
pressure on one another. Rarely is the strength of the parties in perfect balance. Therefore, the policy contemplates sheer bargaining
power as one of the principal determinants of a settlement. Of
course, it can be argued that even if this is so, bargaining power
ought to be confined to the limits of mandatory subject matter.
Otherwise, the base for industrial strife is unduly broadened. So
long as it is clear that the Borg-Warner rule has the effect of
imposing government regulation over what might otherwise qualify
as good faith collective bargaining, a judgment as to the desirability
of the rule is perhaps better withheld pending further examination
of the mandatory subject matter category.
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III.

BARGAINING ISSUES OF THE FUTURE

Bargaining demands which are already known, or are appearing
on the horizon, make two things clear: (1) the Board and the courts
are going to have to go through a searching re-examination of what
constitutes a proper subject for mandatory bargaining, and (2)
insofar as such subjects are held to be non-mandatory, the implications of the Borg-Warner rule are going to have to be faced.
The R.R. Telegraphers case" illustrates the kind of issue which
may be expected to arise with increasing frequency in the period
immediately ahead. In that case the Northwestern Railroad sought
to abandon some of its stations. The plan would necessarily result in
the loss of jobs for some of the station agents and telegraphers who
were members of the union. The union thereupon sought to negotiate
a collective bargaining agreement which would include the rule that
no position in existence on a certain date could be abolished or discontinued except by agreement between the carrier and the union.
The district court thought that the contract proposal related to
"rates of pay, rules, and working conditions"; the circuit court of
appeals said that this conclusion was "clearly erroneous"; however,
the Supreme Court agreed with the district court. In doing so it said:
"In the collective bargaining world today, there is nothing strange
'
about agreements that affect the permanency of employment. "M
Four of the justices, however, did not agree. They said that the
union's demand was not a lawfully bargainable subject, that the
carrier could not lawfully accept it, and that a strike to force its
acceptance would be one to force a violation of the law."
This decision is of particular interest because of the present
emphasis in collective bargaining on job security. Technological
changes are altering historic employment patterns, with a general
exodus from production to service industries. In 1961, blue-collar
jobs for men dropped by 1,300,000 but white-collar jobs rose by
600,000. 33 Approximately 400,000 railroad jobs have been abolished
in the last five years, and the unions fear that mergers now under
discussion will add another 200,000 to this total. 4 More steel was
poured in 1961 by 460,000 production workers than 540,000 workers had produced ten years earlier, and 200,000 aircraft workers were
dropped in the shift from planes to missiles.'
362 U.S. 330 (1960).
" 363 U.S. at 336.
i0

32Id. at 355.
"New York Times, April 6, 1961, p. 18, col. 8.
4
New York Times, April 6, 1961, p. 18, col. 7.
3"New York Times, April 7, 1961, p. 16, col. 3.
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In an effort to protect their members, unions have devised a
wide assortment of bargaining demands. These demands range from
insistence that no plant be moved without the consent of the union,
to guarantees against plant closings, to rigid retention of employees
and preservation of wage rates despite any changes which may take
place, to transfer rights including guarantees against loss in the sale
of the employee's home or cancellation of his lease. Several agreements along such lines have already been reached." One involved
the American Cable and Radio Corporation and the Communications Workers of America." This contract provided that no worker
shall be laid off or downgraded as a result of technological change.
If fewer employees are required as a result of automation, the
company is obliged to place the dislodged workers in other jobs
carrying an equivalent title and pay rate. Which, if any, of these
demands are within the mandatory bargaining requirements of the
Act, and what will be the result of holding that they are voluntary?
If the dissent in the R.R. Telegrapher's case is right (and the analogy
is not perfect because of other legislation in the railroad field),
many of the above demands of unions might be said to be in the
"voluntary" category. Yet, these are among the significant bargaining issues of the period ahead. Unions will be derelict in servicing
their members if they do not put forth demands designed to protect
job security." If bargaining demands having to do with job security
are not within the mandatory bargaining area of "wages, hours, and
terms and conditions of employment," the net result will be that
one of the most important bargaining problems of the period will
be outside the main stream of the very legislation which was designed
to encourage collective bargaining. Presumably there is nothing
illegal about such demands; therefore, if they are not mandatory,
they must be classified as voluntary. The agreements already cited
indicate that many management representatives will willingly bargain over such issues. Others may not. What then? Does the BorgWarner rule mean that unions, by insisting, will be guilty of a per se
unfair labor practice even though the demands are legal, are advanced
in the utmost good faith, and are clearly related to the basic needs
of the membership? Finally, if such demands are non-mandatory,
and will result in an unfair labor practice charge if pushed to an
36No. 416 CBNC Part 1, May 12, 1961, p. 1.
"eNew York Times, June 19,

1961, p. 18, col. 3.

Moreover, "the fact that trade unions may restrict the rate at which new machinery
and processes are introduced does not necessarily mean that the product of industry is
being limited, as employers, left to themselves, may make changes at a rate faster than
the optimum." Slichter, Union Policies and Industrial Management $ (1941).
36
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impasse, will collective bargaining legislation be serving its basic
purpose?
There is another line of cases, represented by Allen Bradley Co. v.
NLRB, 3 which seems destined for the Supreme Court, and which
may clarify the duty to bargain picture. In those cases" the union
threatened to, and did, fine members who crossed the picket line
during a strike. When bargaining rolled around in 1959 the Company demanded that one of the two following alternative clauses be
included in the contract:
Neither the Company nor the Union nor its members will interfere
with, restrain or coerce by discipline, discharge, fine or otherwise, any
employee in the exercise of his rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the
Labor-Management Relations Act, including the right to refrain from
any or all of the specified activities.
Or
Neither the Company nor the Union nor its members will interfere with,
restrain or coerce by discipline, discharge, fine or otherwise, any employee in the exercise of his right to self-organization, to form, join
or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of his own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities
for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, or his right to refrain from any or all such activities."
In submitting these proposals the Company stated that it was
open to discussion as to the phraseology, but that it would stand
firmly on the principle set forth in the clauses. The Union took
the position that this was not a proper subject for collective bargaining because it pertained to internal union affairs. The Company
clearly bargained in good faith in all other respects. When the Company insisted upon inclusion of clauses like the one set forth above, the
Union filed unfair labor practice charges. Relying principally on the
Borg-Warner case, the NLRB held for the Union." The circuit court
refused to enforce the Board's order on the ground that this case was
distinguishable from Borg-Warner in that the clauses in question were
a subject of mandatory bargaining.
One need only go back in history a bit to illustrate the dubiety of
the distinction between the non-mandatory ballot clause in BorgWarner and the mandatory discipline clause in Allen Bradley. In
1948 Allis-Chalmers and its employees suffered a costly strike at
the Company's West Allis plant. The local union leadership, then
3'286 F.2d 442 (7th Cir. 1961).
4
E.g., Local 248, UAW v. Wisconsin Bd., 105 N.W.2d
41 286 F.2d at 444.
42 127 N.L.R.B. No. 8 (1960).

278 (1960).
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dominated by Harold Christoffel, who was commonly believed to
be a Communist, engaged in the most outrageous ballot-stuffing
practices in calling the strike." After several years of continuing
conflict, Christoffel was dislodged and the local union placed under
an Administrator from the International Union. Thereafter in 1950,
the parties signed a contract which contained the following "democratic processes" clause:
The said elections shall be conducted by secret ballot by the Union
on the Company's premises. The Company shall furnish suitable facihties. Members losing time from work in voting shall be paid at average earned rate. A voting schedule shall be arranged in accordance with
the practices of the National Labor Relations Board in effect on the
date of signing this agreement."'
The purpose of the clause was obviously to prevent a repetition
of the 1948 experience. Both parties desired this. Suppose they had
not. Suppose the Company had simply insisted on such a provision
in bargaining. Would it have been guilty of an unfair labor practice
because this was not a mandatory bargaining subject? If so can
one easily distinguish the Allen Bradley case? If, in that case, as the
circuit court said, "The purpose of the clauses proposed here was
to permit employees to work both for their benefit and for that
of the employer,"4 did the democratic processes clause have a different purpose?
There are cases, of course, in which the employer quite clearly
interferes with the internal processes of the union. But there is a
gray area, particularly as it relates to the procedures for calling a
strike, and any continuation of work during the strike, in which it
is pretty hard to say that contractual clauses do not relate to working
conditions. What more basic working condition is there than whether
there is going to be any work at all?
Until it is overturned or modified, Borg-Warner must be regarded
as the law. Critics may feel that it represents an unduly restrictive
interpretation of the phrase "wages, hours, and terms and conditions
of employment," and that it places the weight of government behind the status quo. The danger in an approach having these dual
characteristics is that collective bargaining will not remain viable.
And if the history of collective bargaining demonstrates anything,
it is that change and adjustment are essential to its life cycle.
At least two alternative routes away from Borg-Warner are
4

Allis-Chalmers Workers' v. Wis. E.R.B., 8 L.R.R.M. 1148 (1941).
Collective Bargaining Agreement between the Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. and
Local 248, UAW, Art. II, Sec. G.
4' 286 F.2d at 445.
44 1950_-5
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available. The first lies in the direction of liberalizing the interpretation of the "wages, hours, and terms and conditions of employment"
phrase. The end result then more nearly becomes Allen Bradley than
Borg-Warner. The price of this approach is enlargment of the mandatory bargaining area, with accompanying governmental pressure
towards such bargaining. This may displease Congress which, at the
time of the Taft-Hartley amendments in 1947, fairly clearly thought
the NLRB was intervening too much in telling the parties what they
must bargain about." Such a ruling would doubtless hasten the
inclusion of marginal subjects in contracts, for if a subject is once
brought into the mandatory bargaining area it becomes more difficult
to resist some kind of a compromise without engaging in an unfair
labor practice. Liberalization of the scope of mandatory bargaining
could, of course, be accompanied by maintenance of the present
Borg-Warner rule with respect to voluntary subjects. For those who
believe in maximum flexibility in the realm of collective bargaining
this approach might be thought to combine the worst feature of
the present rule with error in exactly the opposite direction. In other
words, to expand the mandatory bargaining area is to extend the
government's influence over subjects about which the parties must
bargain. To maintain the Borg-Warner rule is to use the government's influence against good faith bargaining on voluntary subjects.
A second route away from Borg-Warner, assuming the courts
want to take it, is to interpret the phrase "wages, hours, and terms
and conditions of employment" conservatively, but find that going
to an impasse on voluntary subjects of bargaining is not, per se, an
unfair labor practice. The principal opponents of this view may
be those who fear the power of strong unions over weak managements, or vice versa. Of the two, management opponents may be
the more vociferous for fear of further inroads into the so-called
management prerogatives.
IV.

BARGAINING TACTICS

The Insurance Agents'47 decision, in which union harassing tactics
such as the refusal to solicit new business, reporting late at district
offices, engaging in "sit-in" mornings rather than doing customary
duties, etc., were held not to be inconsistent with good faith bargaining on the part of the union, was not a great surprise."' The fact
46 H.R. Rep. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 19-20
47361 U.S. 477 (1960).

(1947).

48Previous cases have suggested the likelihood of such a result. E.g., Textile Workers
Union of America, CIO v. NLRB, 227 F.2d 409 (D.C. Cir.), cert. granted, 350 U.S. 1084
(1955), but vacated 352 U.S. 864 (1956). Much of the comment which the case has
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that unions may now engage in harassing tactics without committing an unfair labor practice has naturally caused speculation
as to what tactics the employer might use with like immunity."
However, the long run importance of the Insurance Agents' case,
it is submitted, has to do with neither the harassing tactics, as such,
nor the question of whether a per se rule (that a partial strike could
not be evidence of an unfair labor practice) was established. The
important question relates to the role which the government is going
to play in collective bargaining. Note with care some of Mr. Justice
Brennan's language in the majority opinion:
Congress [at the time of the passage of the Wagner Act] was generally
not concerned with the substantive terms on which the parties contracted. . . .And in fact criticism of the Board's application of the
"good faith" test arose from the belief that it was forcing employers
to yield to union demands if they were to avoid a successful charge of
unfair labor practice .... Since the Board was not viewed by Congress
as an agency which should exercise its powers to arbitrate the parties'
substantive solutions of the issues in their bargaining, a check on this
apprehended trend was provided by writing the good-faith test of bargaining into Section 8 (d) of the Taft-Hartley Act."
The same problems as to whether positions taken at the bargaining table
violated the good-faith test continue to arise under the Act as amended
[by the Taft-Hartley Act]. . . .But it remains clear that § 8 (d)
was an attempt by Congress to prevent the Board from controlling the
settling of the terms of collective agreements.9 '
It is apparent from the legislative history of the whole Act that the
policy of Congress is to impose a mutual duty upon the parties to
confer in good faith with a desire to reach agreement, in the belief
that such an approach from both sides of the table promotes the
over-all design of achieving industrial peace. . . .Discussion conducted
under that standard of good faith may narrow the issues, making the
real demands of the parties clearer to each other, and perhaps to themselves, and may encourage an attitude of settlement through give and
take. The mainstream of cases before the Board and in the courts reviewing its orders, under the provisions fixing the duty to bargain
collectively, is concerned with insuring that the parties should have
evoked has been directed at one of the two following questions: (1) what other tactics
may the parties, particularly the employer, use without being guilty of an unfair labor
practice, and (2) will the Frankfurter dissent ultimately come to be the law in such cases?
" There have been few cases so far which test the point, and there is little to be gained
by re-stating other analyses of the general problem which have already appeared. Green,
Employer Responses to Partial Strikes: A Dilemma?, 39 Texas L. Rev. 198 (1960);
Mittenthal, PartialStrikes and National Labor Policy, 54 Mich. L. Rev. 71 (1955). The 9th
Circuit has suggested in the Great Falls Employers' Council case, 277 F.2d 772 (9th Cir.
1960), that "what is sauce for the goose may also be sauce for the gander."
so 361 U.S. at 485.
si Id. at 487.
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wide latitude in their negotiations, unrestricted by any governmental
power to regulate the substantive solution of their differences.52
Why is the above language so important? Because it is basically
inconsistent with the approach which the same court took in the
Borg-Warner case. And which of the two approaches the court takes
in the future is of great importance to the collective bargaining
process.
Assume, if you wish, that the illegal, mandatory, and voluntary
categories into which the NLRB and the courts have so long divided
bargaining demands are now too well established to be abandoned.
Assume also that the company's ballot demand in Borg-Warner
was, as the court said, a voluntary bargaining subject. Did this
necessarily mean that if carried to an impasse the demand was an
unfair labor practice? Doesn't the court say in the Insurance Agents'
case that Congress was not concerned with the substantive terms
on which the parties contracted? And that Section 8 (d) was a check
on a trend which Congress thought it saw in the Board to force the
acceptance of demands made in bargaining? By saying that the
ballot demand was voluntary and could not be carried to an impasse,
the Court, in effect, forced the company to withdraw a demand. Is
there a difference between forcing one party to accept a demand, and
forcing another party to withdraw a demand insofar as the degree
of governmental interference is concerned? If Congress did not
want the Board to force bargaining, is there any more reason to
believe that it wanted the Board to prevent bargaining, so long as
such bargaining was legal and in good faith? Didn't the Court's
decision in Borg-Warner arbitrate a substantive solution which had
been reached in bargaining? Wasn't Section 8 (d) used to control
the settling of the terms of the collective bargaining agreement? Is
Borg-Warner reconcilable with the mainstream of cases before the
Board and in the courts, which is concerned with insuring that the
parties should have wide latitude in their negotiations, unrestricted
by any governmental power to regulate the substantive solution of
their differences?
Placed side-by-side the two cases look like this: Borg-Warner said
that the company could not carry a voluntary bargaining demand
to an impasse, even though the demand was perfectly legal and it
was bargained in good faith. Allowing the company to carry the
issue to an impasse might prevent a settlement (though in fact it
had not), but the other alternative was governmental interference
with the bargaining process. Of the two alternatives, the court seemed
52

Id. at 488.
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to feel that the latter was preferable. The Insurance Agents' case
dealt with harassing tactics employed by the union in support of a
mandatory bargaining demand. The conduct was legal, and the union
bargained in good faith. Allowing the union to continue the tactic
might have the effect of forcing the employer to subsidize his own
strike-a result which on-the-surface seems to be inconsistent with
our theory of collective bargaining. The alternative was government interference with the bargaining process. Of the two alternatives, the court seemed to feel it was better not to interfere. The
incongruity of the two results shows up in a hypothetical case which
combines the two fact situations. Suppose in the insurance case the
agents had used the same harassing tactics in support of a voluntary
bargaining demand. The Board would then find itself in the dubious
position of tolerating the harassing tactics because the Supreme
Court had told it to give the parties wide latitude in bargaining, but
then restraining the union from insisting in good faith on a legal
demand because it was in the voluntary category.
V.

CONCLUSION

The classification of bargaining demands into illegal, mandatory,
and voluntary categories is now probably too well established to be
upset. And there is no particular reason why it should be. There is
little or no argument about the illegal category. Congress certainly
meant that there was a limit to subjects about which the Board
could order the parties to bargain. The serious question that is left
is whether the Board or the courts should intervene to prevent an
impasse over a voluntary subject when the bargaining is being conducted in good faith. The essence of the argument presented here
is that so long as the parties are in good faith, and the demand is
legal, the Board and the courts should keep their hands off. Even if
this is done there will remain a difference between mandatory and
voluntary bargaining subjects in that the government will not step
in to require the parties to bargain about the latter. But neither will
it prevent them from doing so, by ordering one party not to go to
an impasse. The risk that such an approach will broaden the base
for industrial strife will be more than compensated for by allowing
the parties maximum flexibility to adjust to changing times and
conditions.

